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THE THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND COVENANT:
A RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL
PRACTICE AND ETHICS
Joseph Allegretti*
INTRODUCTION
WHAT does religion have to contribute to our thinking about
legal ethics and legal practice? The standard answer would
probably be "Not much." With the splendid exception of Thomas
Shaffer,' and a few other unconventional scholars,2 the study of legal
ethics and the legal profession has developed in isolation from the
thinking of the great religious traditions about questions of law, jus-
tice, and the moral life.3
In this Article, I intend to show that the traditional answer is wrong.
Religion has much to contribute to legal ethics and to our thinking
about the practice of law.
* A.A. & Ethel Yossem Professor of Legal Ethics, Creighton University School
of Law. B.A., Colgate University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977; M.Div., Yale
Divinity School, 1989.
An earlier version of this Article was presented in June 1997 at Fordham University
School of Law for the Conference, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work." An
Interfaith Conference, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1075 (1998). The author wishes to thank
the conference participants for their many helpful comments and written responses.
The author also wishes to thank Creighton University School of Law for its support of
this project. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Creighton Law stu-
dent Tricia O'Hare, Class of 1998.
1. Among Shaffer's many writings which explore the relationship between faith
and lawyering are American Lawyers and Their Communities (with Mary M. Shaffer,
1991) [hereinafter Shaffer, American Lawyers]; Faith and the Professions (1987)
[hereinafter Shaffer, Faith & Professions]; American Legal Ethics: Text, Readings,
and Discussion Topics (1985); On Being a Christian and a Lawyer (1981) [hereinafter
On Being a Christian]. For a sympathetic but not uncritical assessment of Shaffer's
approach to legal ethics, see John D. Ayer, Narrative in the Moral Theology of Tom
Shaffer, 40 J. Legal Educ. 173 (1990); see also 10 J.L. & Religion 277-366 (1993-94)
(containing extensive commentary on the work of Shaffer, and comments by him, on
the occasion of his receipt of the Journal's award for outstanding contributions to the
discipline of law and religion).
2. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
3. An examination of several leading textbooks on legal ethics reveals little or no
treatment of the religious dimensions of legal practice or the relevance of religion to
legal ethics. See Stephen E. Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and
Ethics (4th ed. 1995); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering
(2d ed. 1994); Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Professional Responsibility.
Problems and Materials (6th ed. 1995); Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal
Ethics (2d ed. 1995); Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics (1986).
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My argument will be two-fold. In Part One, I will point out some of
the ways in which our conception of legal ethics and legal practice is
impoverished when we exclude religion from our consideration. In
Parts Two and Three, I will provide an example of how religion can
illuminate the study of legal practice and ethics by developing the con-
nection between my religious faith and my thinking about legal prac-
tice, by presenting and defending what I call a covenantal model of
lawyer-client relationships.4
I. RELIGION AND LEGAL ETHICS
One way to shed light on the relationship between religion and legal
ethics is by comparing the evolution of legal ethics and its sister disci-
pline, bioethics. This comparison clearly reveals the shortcomings
that result from an exclusively secular approach to professional ethics.
A. A Short History of Bioethics and Legal Ethics
A useful overview of the development of bioethics has been pro-
vided by Daniel Callahan,5 the long-time president of the Hastings
Center, and one of the most prominent and influential thinkers in the
field.6 Callahan traces several stages in the history of this discipline.
In the first stage, throughout the 1960s, theology and theologians
dominated the scholarly thinking.7 Callahan remembers, "When I
first became interested in bioethics in the mid-1960s, the only re-
sources were theological or those drawn from within the traditions of
medicine, themselves heavily shaped by religion."8
In the 1970s, however, bioethics entered a second stage, in which
the influence of theology declined dramatically.9 One reason was that
the churches and seminaries shifted their focus to more global con-
cerns such as poverty, racism, and nuclear arms. Equally significant
was the pressure "to frame the issues, and to speak, in a common sec-
ular mode."'1 In order to influence public policy, and avoid the frac-
tious disputes that often characterize religious disagreements, scholars
4. While I write as a Christian, persons of different religious traditions will, of
course, bring their own faith perspectives to bear upon the issues I address.
5. Daniel Callahan, Religion and the Secularization of Bioethics, 20 Hastings
Center Report Special Supp. 2 (July/Aug. 1990).
6. Among Callahan's many important works are: The Troubled Dream of Life:
Living with Mortality (1993); What Kind of Life: The Limits of Medical Progress
(1990); Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society (1987). For a critical as-
sessment of some themes in Callahan's work, see 26 Hastings Center Report 2-47
(1996) (collecting a number of articles discussing Callahan's work).
7. Callahan, supra note 5, at 2.
8. Id. Callahan refers to a number of leading thinkers of this period who were
theologians, including Joseph Fletcher, Paul Ramsey, James Gustafson, Seymour
Siegel, David Feldman, Richard McCormick, and Charles Curran. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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thought it necessary to adopt a language and an ethics that was not
rooted in religion. The philosophers and the lawyers stepped to
center stage, which led to the enshrinement of "[a]n ethic of universal
principles-especially autonomy, beneficence, and justice ....""
Currently, bioethics remains entrenched in this second stage
although Callahan holds out the possibility of a third stage in which
religion and religious scholarship would reassume their place as a
partner in the great debates about the meaning of life and death. 2
If we shift our attention from bioethics to legal ethics, we notice
some interesting similarities and differences. Legal ethics as a field of
scholarship dates only from the 1960s and 1970s. The Watergate crisis
of the mid-1970s is customarily acknowleged as the stimulus for the
development of legal ethics as a distinct field of study and teaching.13
Legal ethics arose, then, at the same moment when bioethics was
breaking free from its religious roots and becoming a secular disci-
pline dominated by philosophy and law.
Indeed, many of the earliest important articles in the field of legal
ethics-among them Richard Wasserstrom's Lawyers as Professionals:
Some Moral Issues, 4 published in 1975, and Charles Fried's The Law-
yer as Friend15, published in 1976-are steeped in the Enlightenment
tradition that characterizes most scholarly writing about bioethics.
Wasserstrom, for example, criticizes lawyer paternalism as violative of
client autonomy,' 6 while Fried argues that the freedom of human be-
ings to enter into personal relationships implies the right of lawyers to
represent whomever they wish.17
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2-4. There are a number of signs of a resurgence of interest in bioethics
on the part of religious thinkers. See eg., Hessel Bouma, III et al., Christian Faith,
Health, and Medical Practice (1989); On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in
Medical Ethics (Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., 1987); Allen Verhey &
Stephen E. Lammers, Theological Voices in Medical Ethics (1993).
13. Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New Cur-
riculum for a New Century, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 193, 194 (1995) (indicating
that the American Bar Association mandated the teaching of professional responsibil-
ity at ABA-accredited law schools as a direct response to the Watergate scandal). A
useful survey of the history of professional responsibility teaching is found in
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. Legal Educ. 31, 33-42
(1992).
14. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum.
Rts. 1 (1975). Wasserstrom's article "may be said to have begun the modem subject
of legal ethics." David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment. Ethics Teach-
ing in Dark Tunes, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 31, 42 n.39 (1995).
15. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 Yale LJ. 1060 (1976).
16. Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 15-24.
17. Fried, supra note 15, at 1068-71, 1076-80. Fried does recognize the right of a
court to appoint a lawyer to represent a criminal defendant, and acknowledges some
duty on the part of a lawyer to represent a client who cannot otherwise find compe-
tent counsel. Id. at 1078-79.
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When we compare the histories of legal ethics and bioethics, the
most striking difference is the absence of a formative stage in legal
ethics shaped by religion and religious thinkers. From the outset,
legal ethics has been dominated by the lawyers and the philosophers.,'
Religion has never played the kind of critical role in legal ethics that it
played in the earliest days of bioethics. 19
B. The Costs of a Secularized Legal Ethics
The divorce of legal ethics from religion has had substantial costs.
Let me mention just four; here, too, I am indebted to Callahan and his
critique of the secularization of bioethics.20
1. The Loss of Religious Wisdom
An exaggerated secularization deprives us of the accumulated wis-
dom of the religious traditions, which have wrestled for thousands of
years with the perennial questions of the moral life.21 For example,
Christianity is concerned with the meaning of human life, its purpose
and its destiny. While Christianity insists upon the goodness of human
beings, it also speaks honestly about their brokenness and estrange-
ment. It places a high value on self-sacrifice and reconciliation, ex-
horting believers to "turn the other cheek"'22 and even to lay down
their lives for each other.23 Christianity has something to say about
the purposes of law and its limits, the duties owed to the secular state,
and the relationship between justice and love.24
Most importantly, in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus
Christ, Christianity finds the central revelation about God's purposes
for human beings. It entreats those who are followers of Jesus to
18. Of course, much of the scholarly work in legal ethics takes the form of tradi-
tional legal analysis of problems, court cases, and codes. A good introduction to legal
ethics scholarship can be obtained by examining current issues of the Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics; see also 1 J. Inst. Stud. Legal Ethics 1 (1996) (containing
papers delivered at the 1996 Hofstra University School of Law conference, "Legal
Ethics: The Core Issues").
19. Interestingly, however, the earliest important writer on legal ethics in
America, David Hoffman, was also a Biblical scholar, and the Bible played a part in
his analysis of the nature and purpose of law. Shaffer, Faith & Professions, supra note
1, at 47-53.
20. Callahan, supra note 5, at 4.
21. Id.
22. Matthew 5:38-40 (New Revised Standard 1989). All Biblical citations and quo-
tations in this article are from the New Revised Standard Version.
23. 1 John 3:16.
24. These topics are beyond the scope of this Article. Many of the writings of
Professor Harold J. Berman treat these and related issues in law and religion. See,
e.g., Harold J. Berman, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion
(1993); Harold J. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion (1974); see also The
Weightier Matters of the Law: Essays on Law and Religion (John Witte, Jr. & Frank
S. Alexander eds., 1988) (collecting essays in honor of Berman).
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model their lives in discipleship upon his. Christians are to love one
another as Jesus has loved us.25
Can anyone deny that this tradition, this way of thinking about life,
has something to contribute to our debates about law, ethics, justice,
and the role of lawyers? Can anyone deny that Judaism, Islam, and
the other religious traditions have something to contribute as well?
Legal ethics benefits when it opens itself to wisdom from every
source, when it grants religion a place at the table-not uniquely privi-
leged, of course, but not uniquely disadvantaged either. As Callahan
says, whatever we may think about the truth claims of religions, we
cannot deny that "they have provided a way of looking at the world
and understanding one's own life that has a fecundity and uniqueness
not matched by philosophy, law, or political theory."' 6 We are all im-
poverished when our moral discourse is limited to the language of
rights and autonomy; when Aquinas, Calvin, and Barth are ignored;
when Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah are deemed irrelevant.
2. Law Fills the Void
When religion and the deep wellsprings of the human spirit are ex-
cluded from legal ethics, law fills the void.27 As Callahan notes, the
removal of religion "leaves us... too heavily dependent upon the law
as the working source of morality. The language of the courts and
legislatures becomes our only shared means of discourse." z Codes
and court decisions become the fundamental arbiter of what is right
and wrong.
This development can be seen in the evolution-or, as some sug-
gest, the devolution 29-of legal ethics codes. The earliest American
Bar of Association code of professional conduct for lawyers, dating
from the early 1900s, was largely aspirational in nature, more like a
gentlemanly code of character than a principled guide to decision-
making. 0 The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility3" included
bottom-line rules of conduct for lawyers, called the Disciplinary
Rules,32 but maintained a link to earlier times by including a number
of aspirational goals for lawyers, which were not enforceable, called
Ethical Considerations. 3 In the most recent American Bar Associa-
25. John 13:34, 15:12.
26. Callahan, supra note 5, at 2.
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id.
29. Luban & Milemann, supra note 14, at 42-53. The article contains an excellent
overview of the history of lawyer regulation in America.
30. These were the American Bar Association's 1908 Canons of Professional Eth-
ics. See Wolfram, supra note 3, at 53-56. The Canons were often criticized for their
generality, ambiguity, and irrelevance to the actual work of lawyers. Id.
31. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1969) [hereinafter Model Code].
32. Id. at Preamble and Preliminary Statement.
33. Id.
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tion draft rules for lawyers, the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, 34 the Ethical Considerations are conspicuous by their absence.
All that remains are the bottom-line rules and the accompanying com-
ments that serve as aids to their interpretation.35
In the shift from canons of professional ethics, to a code of profes-
sional responsibility, to rules of professional conduct, we can trace
what Luban and Millemann call the "de-moralization" of legal eth-
ics. 36 Reading or teaching the Model Rules, it is easy to embrace the
illusion that rules constitute the whole of the moral life, with the result
that legality and morality are conflated, and anything legal is assumed
to be moral.37 When this happens, legal ethics is approached not as a
subspecies of moral philosophy or professional ethics, but as a course
in substantive law akin to torts or corporations. 38 It is no surprise that
the leading treatise on legal ethics is entitled simply The Law of
Lawyering.39
Rules are important, of course, for a variety of reasons.40 Rules
reinforce what lawyers already know but may be tempted to forget-
they warn lawyers not to lie or to falsify evidence. 1 They establish
the ground rules for the trade of lawyering-they instruct lawyers
what they can say in their advertisements and write on their business
cards.42 At their best, rules provide lawyers with practical guidance as
34. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules].
35. Id. at Scope.
36. Luban & Millemann, supra note 14, at 45. As the authors recognize, however,
some Model Rules do embody moral obligations. Id. at n.50. Nevertheless, it "is the
moral aspiration that has gradually been excised from American lawyers' professional
consensus." Shaffer, American Lawyers, supra note 1, at 7.
37. See James Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J.
Legal Educ. 11, 19-20 (1982). Elkins argues that:
By focusing on such a 'bottom line,' one is likely to encourage an ethics
based on what lawyers in general are willing to call ethical-the line which
may not be crossed by any lawyer. Concentration on the minimum require-
ments imposed on all lawyers obscures the choice of a standard of behavior
for the individual lawyer, a choice that affects personal integrity, self-image,
and human aspiration (the spirit as well as the letter of the law).
Id. at 20; see also Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment
in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 145, 172-76 (1996) ("The
common view that legal ethics begins with and ends with the profession's ethics codes
is a fundamental mistake .... A rule-oriented approach implies that ethics need not
be viewed broadly, that is, as an aspect of morality. 'Real' ethics is trivialized or
ignored.").
38. See Rhode & Luban, supra note 3, at 929 (noting that some legal ethics
courses are excessively rule-oriented, with little attention to ethical theory or the real-
ities of legal practice); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
39. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2d ed. 1985 with annual
supplements).
40. For an overview of the importance of rules in legal ethics, and their limitations,
see Cramton & Koniak, supra note 37, at 170-76.
41. See Model Rules, supra note 34, Rules 3.3, 3.4, 4.1.
42. See id. Rules 7.1, 7.2.
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they wrestle with ethical questions. Rules make it possible for lawyers
and clients to have reasonably certain standards about what is and
what is not expected, required, and prohibited in legal representation.
They announce the agreed-upon minimums below which a lawyer can-
not fall without incurring sanction, and thereby provide a basis for
moral and legal accountability.43
Rules, however, are only part of the moral life." Many of the rules
implicitly recognize this limitation by vesting discretion in lawyers to
decide whether and how to act.4" Thus, the rules themselves envision
that lawyers will exercise personal judgment.46 Furthermore, while
rules can establish legal minimums, they ignore many of the interest-
ing and important issues in legal practice. Rules cannot tell a lawyer
whom her clients should be. Rules cannot empower a lawyer to be
caring or courageous. They cannot teach a lawyer how to balance a
client's lawful interests against the harm that will be done to oppo-
nents and third parties. They cannot tell a lawyer whether a tactic or
strategy that can be employed should be employed. Moreover, rules
provide no guidance for the lawyer who is grappling with questions
that the rules themselves ignore-questions such as the ends of lawy-
ering or the lawyer's moral accountability for her actions.47 No rule
can tell a lawyer if the rule itself should be obeyed.4" If we are to deal
with these profound and fundamental questions, we need a more-en-
43. While I have been using the word "rules," I am not referring only to the codes
of professional conduct governing lawyers. Lawyers are also subject to a wide variety
of criminal and civil regulations. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 39, §§ 100-01; see
also Cramton & Koniak, supra note 37, at 173 ("The fact that the ethics codes provide
little guidance on many matters requires that the 'other law' of lawyering receive
systematic attention.").
44. See supra note 37. For a blistering attack on the very nature of legal ethics
rules, see Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Texas
L. Rev. 639 (1981).
45. For a discussion of the discretion granted to lawyers by ethics rules, see An-
drew L. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility 765-84 (3d ed. 1989).
46. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 14, at 56 ("ITihe Model Rules include
numerous provisions that tell lawyers what they can do rather than what they can't.
These vest substantial discretion in lawyers, and therefore assume that lawyers' judg-
ment must be the ultimate guide to ethical action.").
47. [C]odes have limited effect because they are set within the current hori-
zons of law and medicine. These horizons are assumed to be normative and
the codes address only issues concerning how a person, practicing within one
of the already established professions, should conduct him or herself. What
is missing is any attempt to address the adequacy of the structures and values
of the existing professions.
Charles Kammer, Vocation and the Professions, in The Annual of the Society of
Christian Ethics 153, 167-68 (Thomas W. Ogletree ed., 1981).
48. For a recent colloquy on the lawyer's obligation to obey the law, see David
Luban, Legal Ideals and Moral Obligations: A Comment on Simon, 38 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 255 (1996); William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Last'?, 38 Win. &
Mary L. Rev. 217 (1996); David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law And Morality: Why
Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 Win.& Mary L Rev.
269 (1996).
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compassing approach to legal ethics and legal practice. This leads to
my third point.
3. The Avoidance of Particularity
When we exclude religion from legal ethics, we are tempted to de-
lude ourselves into thinking that we are not members of particular
communities but only one "sprawling, inchoate general community."4 9
We are encouraged to keep our private values to ourselves or to hide
them beneath a veneer of detached and impartial rationality. As Cal-
lahan notes, "[t]ime and again I have been told by religious believers
at a conference or symposium that they feared revealing their deepest
convictions. They felt that the price of acceptance was to talk the
common language, and they were probably right."" ° The result is the
trivialization and marginalization of religion-it is reduced to the sta-
tus of a mere "hobby," as Stephen Carter observes in his book The
Culture of Disbelief.51
We thereby risk excluding questions of character and virtue from
our moral reflections. We are tempted to ignore the most important
things about ourselves-who we are and want to be, what particular
communities and traditions have shaped us into the persons we are,
how we see our lives lived against the backdrop of eternity.5 2 None of
this seems relevant; instead, we feel obligated to speak what Jeffrey
Stout calls the "moral esperanto" of autonomy and rights.5 3
But if we are unwilling to ask "who am I?" and "who do I want to
be?", how can we hope to answer the question "what should I do?"
As Stanley Hauerwas observes, "the kind of quandaries we confront
depend on the kind of people we are and the way we have learned to
construe the world through our language, habits, and feelings.... The
question of what I ought to do is actually about what I am or ought to
be."54 For example, my thinking about the duties I owe to my client,
or to a third party who may be injured by my actions, cannot be di-
vorced from my understanding of myself as a disciple of Christ called
to live out the Gospel message of love and reconciliation. 5
49. Callahan, supra note 5, at 4.
50. Id.
51. Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics
Trivialize Religious Devotion (1993) (see especially Chapter Two, "God as a
Hobby").
52. Thomas Shaffer has explored many of these questions in his writings, espe-
cially in American Lawyers, supra note 1.
53. Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discon-
tents 74-76 (1988).
54. Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics 117
(1983). The recent resurgence of interest in virtue-ethics of virtue owes much to theo-
logian Hauerwas and to philosopher Alaisdair Maclntyre. See Alaisdair Maclntyre,
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2d ed. 1981).
55. See Joseph Allegretti, Rights, Roles, Relationships: The Wisdom of Solomon
and the Ethics of Lawyers, 25 Creighton L. Rev. 1119 (1992).
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This broader approach to ethical reflection necessarily encompasses
the religious dimensions of the self. Following Paul Tillich, we might
conceive of religion as that which concerns us ultimately.6 Defined
that way, religion is one of the most important constituents of a per-
son's self-identity. Our religious values are integrally tied up with-
the root meaning of the word religion is to tie, to bind-our deepest
wishes, dreams, and fears. As Hauerwas reminds us, our religious
convictions are themselves a kind of morality.' They make certain
choices inevitable and others unthinkable.
A professional ethic that envisions the human person as an autono-
mous rational agent without ties to particular communities and tradi-
tions is an ethic that ignores these foundations of the moral life. It is
also an ethic that tends to perpetuate the status quo. As Callahan
notes, the culturally-free rationalism that dominates bioethics often
leads to a "reluctance to question the conventional ends and goals of
medicine, thereby running a constant risk of simply legitimating...
the way things are.""8 Religious thinking provides a challenge to the
status quo by addressing the ends and purposes of medicine, law, and
the human person. Christianity, for example, affirms that the Gospel
stands in judgment over all human institutions, including the legal pro-
fession and the justice system.
4. The Needs of Religious Believers
Finally, the exclusion of religion from legal ethics ignores the per-
sonal needs of many lawyers:5 9 Many lawyers are religious believers
in the conventional sense (and if we adopt Tillich's definition, all are
religious).60 These lawyers want not only to abide by their profes-
sional codes of conduct, but to act in accord vith their deepest values.
They want to live a life of purpose and meaning. For such lawyers,
rules and codes are a thin gruel that cannot furnish them with the
sustenance they need. As Allen Verhey and Stephen Lammers ob-
serve, "Members of religious communities-or many of them, at any
rate-want to make [the] choices they face with religious integrity, not
just impartial rationality."'"
56. Paul Tfllich, The New Being 152-60 (1955); Paul Tillich, 1 Systematic Theology
11-12 (1951). Tiflich often used the word "faith" to refer to this quality of ultimate
concern. See Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (1957).
57. Hauerwas, supra note 54, at 16 ("[blur convictions embody our morality; our
beliefs are our actions.").
58. Callahan, supra note 5, at 4; see also supra note 47.
59. Callahan, supra note 5, at 4.
60. A 1990 survey of church attendance by "elites" found that 15% of corporate
lawyers surveyed attended church weekly, 16% monthly, 46% a few times a year, and
24% never. The figures for federal judges were 17% weekly, 20% monthly, 51%
yearly, and 12% never. Michael Novak, Business as a Calling: Work and the Ex-
amined Life 44-45 (1996). Attendance at church, of course, is only one indicator of
religiosity.
61. Verhey & Lammers, supra note 12, at 5.
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For all these reasons, our conceptions of legal ethics and legal prac-
tice suffer when we rigidly adhere to a secularistic, legalistic, code-
dominated mindset. We need to broaden our perspective to make
room for religion as well as philosophy and law.
I am not alone in this view. Indeed, there are several hopeful signs
that legal ethics, like bioethics, may be poised to enter a new stage of
development in which religion will be allowed to play a meaningful
role. No longer is Professor Thomas Shaffer-who has bucked the
dominant orthodoxy for twenty years by bringing an explicitly reli-
gious dimension to legal ethics-a solitary voice crying in the wilder-
ness.62 This issue of the Fordham Law Review is a prime example, as
is last year's Texas Tech School of Law's Faith and Lawyering Sympo-
sium, a 500-page volume of essays by lawyers and law professors from
every imaginable religious tradition.63 My own book, The Lawyer's
Calling: Christian Faith and Legal Practice,' is another example.
If we agree that religion has some role to play in our thinking about
legal practice, the next question is: What role? What might religion
contribute to our thinking about legal ethics and legal practice? There
will not be one answer, of course, given the extraordinary variety of
religious traditions and the divergent strands of understanding within
these traditions. Our religious beliefs are filtered through our unique
life experiences, family upbringing, and personality.
With this caveat in mind, I propose now to examine the lawyer-
client relationship through the prism of my own understanding of the
Christian faith. Consider this a case study of the way in which one
believer tries to bring an explicitly religious perspective to bear upon
questions of legal ethics and legal practice.
II. LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND CONTRACT
In Part Two of this Article, I will look briefly at the relationship
between lawyers and clients. I will identify some of the problems that
can arise in this relationship, particularly the problem of lawyer or
client domination. Then, I will sketch the way in which the legal pro-
fession typically deals with this problem of domination-by means of
what I call the contractual model of lawyer-client relationships. In
Part Three, I will describe and defend a different model rooted in my
religious beliefs-a covenantal model-and will compare and contrast
it to the contractual model.
62. See supra note 1.
63. Faith and the Law Symposium: A Symposium Precis, 27 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 911
(1996).
64. Joseph Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling: Christian Faith and Legal Practice
(1996).
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A. The Lawyer-Client Relationship
A core of expectations surrounds the parties to the lawyer-client
relationship. According to what David Rosenthal calls the "tradi-
tional approach,"65 clients are expected to be docile and passive.
They should trust their lawyers to act in their best interests. They
should not ask many questions or take too active a role in their case.
In contrast, lawyers are expected to be aggressive, decisive, and
competent. "The traditional idea is that both parties are best served
by the professional's assuming broad control over solutions to the
problems brought by the client."66 This traditional model, however,
has been sharply criticized in recent years. Critics charge that it en-
courages lawyers to dominate their clients and act paternalistically to-
wards them.
67
The reasons for this lawyer dominance are not difficult to under-
stand.68 Clients are often vulnerable, troubled persons. They fre-
quently lack an understanding of the language or the nuances of the
law. They are strangers in the strange land of the courts. They have
little choice but to trust in the competence of their lawyer. Con-
65. Douglas E. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? 7-13 (1974). A
similar phenomenon has long been recognized in medical circles. The patient, for
example, is expected to be passive and trusting of the physician. The classic account
of this "sick role" is Talcott Parsons, The Social System 428-79 (1951).
66. Rosenthal, supra note 65, at 7. Rosenthal, however, argues for what he calls a
"participatory model," in which the lawyer and client are engaged in a mutual deci-
sion-making process. Id. at 7-13.
67. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L Rev. 454;
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 29; Wasserstrom, supra note 14; A good overview of the
problems of paternalism can be found in Rhode & Luban, supra note 3, at 578-620.
68. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 15-24, Simon, supra note 67, at 52-60;
Christopher Mooney has provided a useful summary of the "inequality that is intrinsic
to all professionalism":
By definition, the lawyer possesses an expertise not easily obtainable
outside the profession. Along with this expertise goes a special language by
which lawyers communicate with other lawyers but not with clients.
Since communication is one distinguishing characteristic of persons, this
fact helps make the client less than a person in the lawyer's eyes. The client
has the added disadvantage of not really being able to evaluate how well or
badly the lawyer is performing. Not clients but fellow professionals evaluate
lawyers, since, unlike clients, they have the power to criticize and regulate
effectively.
Finally, clients almost always have some serious life problem, and this
tends to render them vulnerable and to induce dependence on lawyers for
advice and well-being. This life problem, in turn, naturally leads the lawyer
to see the client partially, to focus on that part of his or her person that can
be altered, corrected, or otherwise assisted professionally. For all these rea-
sons, the lawyer-client relationship conspires to depersonalize clients in law-
yers' eyes and to foster responses to them that are manipulative and
paternalistic.
Christopher Mooney, Law: A Vocation to Justice and Love, in The Professions in
Ethical Context: Vocations to Justice and Love 85 (F. Eigo, O.S.A., ed., 1986).
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versely, lawyers have been acculturated to see themselves as "mem-
bers of an elite ... different from and somewhat better" than those
they are paid to serve.6 9
As a result, lawyers may see their clients not as whole persons, but
as something less, as children perhaps, or as broken objects needing to
be fixed.7" Lawyer domination can lead, inexorably, to lawyer pater-
nalism. It is tempting for the lawyer to treat the client "as though the
client were an individual who needed to be looked after and con-
trolled, and to have decisions made for him or her by the lawyer, with
as little interference from the client as possible."'"
Lawyer domination discourages a full and frank dialogue between
the parties. There is little incentive to discuss moral questions if the
lawyer does not view her client as her moral equal. The lawyer may
come to bracket her own moral values and see herself not as a moral
agent but as a moral neuter whose work is divorced from the rest of
her life, including her religious commitments.
Domination, however, is not a one-way street. "[P]rivate practi-
tioners depend wholly on their clients for their livelihood, and this
dependence is fundamental in the distribution of power. 7T2 Further-
more, many clients, especially businesses, are savvy about the legal
system and how it works. Such clients are not as dependent upon their
lawyer or as vulnerable to manipulation and domination. 73 At times it
is the client who controls the relationship or manipulates her lawyer.
When this happens, however, the same problems result. Once again
the relationship is not one of equality in which the two parties are
open to each other. Once again the lawyer brackets her moral values.
The lawyer is tempted to become little more than a "hired gun" who
will do whatever her client wants as long as the client is paying.74
B. The Contractual Model
One way to deal with the problem of domination is to adopt what I
call a contractual model of the lawyer-client relationship.75 In medical
69. Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 18.
70. Id. at 21.
71. Id. at 22.
72. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal, and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Rela-
tionship: A Reply to Steven Ellmann, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004, 1036-37 (1990).
73. Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 610 (1st ed. 1992) ("One
might wonder, however, whether similar worries about power asymmetries are appro-
priate in cases involving sophisticated business clients rather than divorce or legal aid
clients, particularly since corporate managers often use their own in-house counsel to
direct and control outside attorneys.").
74. See Joseph Allegretti, Have Briefcase Will Travel: An Essay on the Lawyer as
Hired Gun, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 747 (1991).
75. A model might be thought of as a "typical vision" or a "distinctive mindset."
Avery Dulles, Models of the Church 11-12 (expanded edition 1987). Models function
largely at the unconscious or pre-cognitive level, and thus can influence our thinking
and our behavior without our realizing it. No one model, of course, can capture the
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ethics, the contractual model is usually identified with the work of
Robert Veatch.76 Veatch has argued that the problem of domination
in professional relations can be dealt with by endorsing a relationship
of mutual autonomy and respect. Veatch envisions the parties as com-
ing together to fulfill certain limited goals. Each party has specific
obligations towards the other.77 If either party fails to live up to its
promises, the other party can go to court and demand recompense for
the breach. The relationship is a matter of quid pro quo.
Under this contractual model, each party has primary responsibility
for making certain decisions. Veatch explains:
With the contractual model there is a sharing in which the patient
has legitimate grounds for trusting that once the basic value frame-
work for medical decision-making is established on the basis of the
patient's own values, the myriads of minute medical decisions which
must be made day in and day out in the care of the patient will be
made by the physician within that frame of reference.78
This sharing of power assumes a sharing of relevant information so
that each side can make the decisions within its scope of authority on
the basis of the relevant facts.7 9 The contractual model in medicine
relies heavily upon the principle of informed consent.'
A similar model applies to the lawyer-client relationship. The law-
yer-client relationship is not based solely on contract, of course, and
lawyers have certain obligations to clients that go beyond the scope of
their contract."1 Nevertheless, for most lawyers, most of the time, it is
the contractual model that sets the parameters for their interactions
whole of reality. Like metaphors, models not only shape reality, they distort it as well.
See Milner Ball, Lying Down Together 22 (1985).
76. Robert M. Veatch, A Theory of Medical Ethics (1981) [hereinafter Veatch,
Theory]; Robert M. Veatch, Models for Ethical Medicine in a Revoltionary Age, 2
Hastings Center Report 5 (1972) [hereinafter Veatch, Models].
77. Veatch, Models, supra note 76, at 7; Veatch, Theory, supra note 76, at 134-37.
78. Veatch, Models, supra note 76, at 7; see also Harold Brody, The Physician!
Patient Relationship in Medical Ethics 65-91, 70, (Robert M. Veatch ed., 1989):
By this model, the physician would take responsibility for all purely techni-
cal decisions, of the sort for which one is specifically prepared for by medical
training. The patient would retain control over decisions that involved per-
sonal moral values or life-style preferences, which she could be expected to
know more about than the physician could.
Id. The Brody chapter contains an excellent overview of the contract model and the
criticisms of it.
79. Brody, supra note 78, at 70 ("The Contractual Model envisions a process of
information exchange and negotiation between the two parties as various decisions
are encountered.").
80. Id. at 78-82. A good discussion of the doctrine of informed consent can be
found in Fay A. Rozovsky, Consent to Treatment: A Practical Guide (2d ed. 1990).
81. "The lawyer-client relationship is a complex one founded on contract and
agency law but infused with professional ideals and governed in part by regulatory
principles flowing from a lawyer's role as an officer of the court." Hazard et al., supra
note 3, at 472; see also Wolfram, supra note 3, at 146 ("The law of contract defines the
client-lawyer relationship for many, but hardly for all purposes.").
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with clients.8 2 A lawyer is hired by a client to help resolve a problem,
settle a dispute, or plan a transaction. The lawyer and the client agree
upon a fee. Each party has certain specific obligations to the other. If
either party fails to meet its obligations, the other party may resort to
legal remedies.
The contractual model of lawyer-client relationships presupposes a
doctrine of informed consent. Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, for example, a lawyer has the duty to provide the client with
all relevant information necessary for the client to make important
decisions.8 3 Furthermore, the contractual model envisions an alloca-
tion of decision-making authority along the lines of Veatch's frame-
work for medical decision-making. The traditional rule of thumb is
that ultimate decisions (the "ends" of the representation) are for the
client, while tactical decisions (the "means" of the representation) are
for the lawyer to decide.' The Model Rules provide that a lawyer
"shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued."8 5
The contractual model undoubtedly provides certain needed pro-
tections for the parties.86 The model respects the autonomy of lawyer
82. Recall that the contract model I am describing is not the same as contract law;
rather, it is a way of seeing the world, a certain kind of mindset.
83. Model Rule 1.4 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit a client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 1.4; see also Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in
the Practice of Law, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 307 (1980); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and
Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 41 (1979).
84. See Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1049 (1984); see also Wolfram,
supra note 3, at 156 ("The division of the realms of client and lawyer decision making
has been variously phrased as ends-means, substance-procedure, strategy-tactics, or
objectives-means.").
85. Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 1.2(a). The Comment to Rule 1.2 states:
"The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obliga-
tions. Within those limits, a client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the
means to be used in pursuing those objectives." Id. Rule 1.2 cmt. The Comment also
states, however, that a lawyer is not required to pursue a certain objective or employ a
particular means solely because the client insists. Id. The Rules recognize that "a
clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in
many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint undertaking." Id. The
Rules permit the lawyer to limit the objectives of the representation if the client con-
sents. Id. Rule 1.2(c).
86. Examining the contract model as it applies to physicians and patients, William
May observes:
The notion of the physician as contractor has obvious appeal. First, it breaks
with more authoritarian models (such as [the physician as] parent or priest).
It emphasizes informed consent rather than blind trust; it encourages respect
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and client. It treats the client like an adult rather than a child.' It
puts the client in control of the ultimate goals of the representation
and provides a mechanism whereby the parties can hold each other
accountable.
There are serious problems, however, with the contractual model.
Although the parties are viewed as rational and autonomous agents
who come together to accomplish a specific end, there is no sense that
they are engaged in a joint venture in which they might change and
grow together. A contractual model is minimalistic and lives by the
letter of the law.8s There is no place in it for "going the extra mile,"
for doing what the parties are not required to do, for acting with care,
compassion, or friendship.8 9
There is an additional defect with this model. We have already seen
that in practice one party-often, but not always, the lawyer-can
dominate and control the relationship. 9 Although the contractual
model is premised on a theoretical equality of bargaining power, it
carefully allocates decision-making authority between the parties, in
effect conceding that one or the other party must be in control. Its
solution to the problem of domination is to draw lines of demarcation
to determine which decisions are for the lawyer and which for the
client.91 While the contractual model speaks the language of equality,
it functions in practice as if weak-willed lawyers need protection from
overbearing and manipulating clients or as if vulnerable clients need
protection from domineering and paternalistic lawyers.
for the dignity of the patient, who does not, because of illness, forfeit auton-
omy as a human being; it also encourages specifying rights, duties, condi-
tions, and qualifications that limit the contract. In effect, it establishes some
symmetry and mutuality in the relationship between doctor and patient as
they exchange information and reach an agreement, tacit or explicit, to ex-
change goods (money for services).
Second, a contract provides for the legal enforcement of terms on both
parties and thus offers each some protection and recourse under the law to
make the other accountable under the contract.
Fmally, a contract .... presupposes frankly that self-interest primarily
governs people.
William F. May, The Physician's Covenant: Images of the Healer in Medical Ethics
117 (1983).
87. But see Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 1.14 (dealing with the lawyer-client
relationship when the client is a minor or under a disability).
88. May, supra note 86, at 118 ("The contractualist approach tends to reduce pro-
fessional obligation to self-interested minimalism, quid pro quo. Do no more for your
patients than what the contract calls for specified services for established fees.").
89. Id. at 122 ("The kind of minimalism that a purely contractualist understanding
of the professional relationship encourages produces a professional too grudging, too
calculating, too lacking in spontaneity, too quickly exhausted to go the second mile
with patients along the road of their distress.").
90. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
91. Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 1.2(a).
92. Hazard et al. observes that "discussions of legal ethics are often predicated on
opposing assumptions as to which side of the relationship poses danger to the other
side or the public interest." Hazard et al., supra note 3, at 476. While some scholars
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In short, the contractual model encourages that same relationship
of "wary strangers" that Callahan criticized in his discussion of the
secularization of bioethics.93 A relationship governed only by con-
tract can degenerate into an uneasy alliance in which each side eyes
the other suspiciously, jealously guarding her own prerogatives, and
trying to protect herself from the manipulations of the other.94
III. FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT
With its emphasis on autonomy and legal rights and remedies, the
contractual model embodies a stilted and incomplete understanding of
persons and relationships. A different model of lawyer-client relation-
ships emerges if we begin from a religious perspective that views
human life as both sacred and social.95
First, humans are sacred.96 This is because we are created in the
image and likeness of God.97 Despite our fallibility and sinfulness,
human beings are subjects of reverence.98 Each of us is of uncondi-
tional value. 99
Such an understanding has profound implications for how we
should treat each other. As Bouma says, "[t]he biblical message... is
are worried about lawyers dominating and abusing their clients, others view the real
problem as "bad" clients whose intent is to bend their lawyers to their will. Id.
93. Callahan, supra note 5, at 4.
94. Austin Sarat and William Felstiner observed and analyzed the relationships
between lawyers and clients in several dozen divorce cases. Austin Sarat & William
L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in Lawyer/Client
Interaction, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 737 (1988). Their conclusions, according to Sarat,
were that "lawyer/client interaction in divorce occurs against a background of mutual
suspicion, if not antagonism, between lawyers and clients.... For divorce lawyers the
client is the enemy, or, if not an enemy, then an uncertain and unreliable partner and
ally." Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda
of Legal Education, 41 J. Legal Educ. 43, 47 (1991). For a broad examination of the
mistrust between lawyers and clients, see Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between
Attorney and Client, 69 Geo. L.J. 1015 (1981).
95. Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Consistent Ethic of Life 60 (1988).
96. "One of Christianity's oldest traditions is sacredness of human life as an impli-
cation of the Christian conviction about God and the good life." Richard A. McCor-
mick, Health and Medicine in the Catholic Tradition: Tradition in Transition 53
(1984) (quoting Albert C. Outler).
97. Genesis 1:26. In the New Testament, Jesus is seen as the reflection of God's
glory, bearing the very imprint of God's being. Hebrews 1:3. Christians, although
fallen, are renewed in God's image through the power of the Holy Spirit. 2 Corinthi-
ans 3:18. See Bouma, supra note 12, at 27-66 (exploring some implications of the idea
that humans are made in God's image, with special attention to the practice of
medicine).
98. Bouma, supra note 12, at 31 ("'Sanctity' is the term many religious persons use
to characterize that which elicits their reverence.... Those who image God are to be
loved reverentially, even deferentially.").
99. The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics 353 (James F. Childress &
John Macquarrie eds., 1986) ("Each individual is infinitely precious to God and made
for an eternal destiny.").
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that in treating persons we are in an important sense treating God."' "m
The Last Judgment in the Gospel of Matthew makes the point more
starkly: "Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these
who are members of my family, you did it to me." 10' Some of the
same awe, respect, and love that we owe to God should be given to
our fellow human beings.102 Indeed, Jesus taught that the greatest of
all commandments was to love God and love our neighbor as our-
self. 03 The life and death of Jesus reveal that God's love for human
beings knows no bounds; likewise, we are called to love one another
as God has loved us."
Second, human life is not only sacred, it is essentially social.' 05 "In
the beginning is relation," says Martin Buber.'0 6 We become who we
are through our relations with each other. We are shaped and
formed-and sometimes deformed-by our relationships. As theolo-
gian Richard McCormick says, "[Ojur well-being is interdependent. It
cannot be conceived of or realistically pursued independently of the
good of others. Sociality is part of our being and becoming.""°
In short, I encounter and serve my God as I encounter and serve
this person, this client. My client and I are not "wary strangers,"' 03
isolated and alienated from each other; instead, we share a common
destiny that is forged in our encounter with each other.
This understanding impels us to move beyond a contractual model
of lawyer-client relationships. My client has unconditional value. I
am obligated not only to honor my contractual obligations, but to re-
vere my client as a human being made in the image and likeness of
God. I am called to do more than abide by a contract: I believe that I
am called to a covenant with my client."°
A. The Idea Of Covenant
Covenant is an important theme in both the Hebrew and Christian
Scriptures. Indeed, covenant is so central to Scripture that theologian
100. Bouma, supra note 12, at 58.
101. Matthew 25:40. The Last Judgement is at vv. 31-46.
102. Bouma, supra note 12, at 30.
103. See, eg., Mark 12:28-34. By linking love of God with love of neighbor, Jesus
combined the teaching of Deuteronomy 6:5 and Leviticus 19:18.
104. See, eg, 1 John 15:12 and 1 John 4:19-21.
105. Bernardin, supra note 95, at 60.
106. Martin Buber, I and Thou 18 (2d ed. 1958); see also Bruce C. Birch & Larry L
Rasmussen, Bible & Ethics in the Christian Life 69 (rev. & expanded ed., 1989)
("[W]e exist only in relation to something outside ourselves. Apart from social relat-
edness-or 'community'-'we' do not exist. Neither do ."'). Birch and Rasmussen's
book contains an excellent discussion of the essential sociality of Christian faith.
107. McCormick, supra note 96, at 55.
108. Callahan, supra note 5, at 4.
109. Although my approach to lawyer-client relationships is grounded in a religious
understanding of persons and relationships, I do not claim that it is necessary to share
my religious views in order to embrace the covenantal model that I am describing.
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Joseph Allen claims that it "provides a unifying theme in the midst of
the multiplicity of the Bible.""'
The Hebrew Scriptures are replete with covenants between God
and humans. There are God's covenants with individuals-Noah, 1 '
Abraham," 2 and David." 3 Most importantly, there is the covenant at
Sinai where the Israelites pledge their obedience to the God who de-
livered them from the bondage of Egypt. 1 4 There are also the pro-
phetic condemnations of Israel, which can only be understood in light
of the Sinai covenant that the people have forgotten or ignored. 115
In the New Testament, the concept of covenant is reinterpreted in
light of the Incarnation. Jesus is presented as the fulfillment of the
Hebrew Scripture promises." 6 Jeremiah had written of a "new cove-
nant" written not on tablets of stone but on the hearts of men and
women." 7 For St. Paul, all who have faith in Christ are members of
this new covenant." 8 When believers participate in the Lord's Sup-
per, they join in the new covenant of Christ. As Jesus himself said,
"[t]his cup is the new covenant in my blood.""' 9 The promise of Jer-
emiah becomes a reality in Jesus.
The God who covenants with humanity values each human being
individually, irreplaceably, and equally. 20 As God's creatures, made
in God's image, humans are imbued with the capacity to covenant
with God and with each other.' 2' Indeed, human beings are called to
reflect God's covenant love for humanity in their relationships with
each other.' This is what David Smith calls the "principle of replica-
110. Joseph L. Allen, Love and Conflict: A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics
18 (1984). Allen's book is probably the best examination of the theme of covenant
for the general reader. My own discussion owes much to him. Also helpful is George
K. Beach, Covenantal Ethics, in The Life of Choice: Some Liberal Religious Perspec-
tives on Morality 107-125 (Clark Kucheman ed. 1978). For the application of the cov-
enantal model to professional-client relationships, important resources include Hessel
Bouma III, supra note 12; May, supra note 86; William F. May, Code, Covenant, Con.
tract, or Philanthropy, 5 Hastings Center Report 29 (1975); Paul Ramsey, The Patient
as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics (1970).
111. Genesis 9.
112. Genesis 12, 15, 17.
113. 2 Samuel 7.
114. Exodus 19-24; Deuteronomy 4-6.
115. See, e.g., Amos 3 and Hosea 1-3; see Allen, supra note 110, at 25.
Where the pre-exilic prophets speak judgment upon the people, that judg-
ment makes sense only against the backround of the Sinai covenant, for that
is what the people have disobeyed. The prophets do not intend to teach a
new morality, but rather to call the people back to loyalty and obedience to
the covenant.
Id.
116. Allen, supra note 110, at 28-29.
117. Jeremiah 31:31-34.
118. See, e.g., Romans 3-4; Galatians 3.
119. 191 Corinthians 11:25.
120. Allen, supra note 110, at 66.
121. Id. at 67-68, 77-81.
122. Id. at 77; see also Bouma, supra note 12, at 84.
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tion": "As God has committed [God's self] to us, so ought we to com-
mit ourselves to each other."'"
Human covenants, of course, are not precisely the same as God's
covenants. As Bouma observes, "Human covenants are not all-en-
compassing, as is the call to discipleship, and their origins are not as
one-sided as is God's covenanting with us." '24
Nevertheless, human covenants do resemble God's more-encom-
passing covenants in certain essential ways. Joseph Allen suggests
that covenant as applied to human relationships has three core charac-
teristics:"z 1) A covenant relationship arises through mutual actions
of entrusting and accepting entrustment. In a covenant, each of the
parties becomes open and vulnerable to the other;"z 2) A covenant is
a creative act that constitutes a moral community in which the parties
have responsibilities to and for each other, responsibilities that go be-
yond the "letter of the law;' 27 and 3) In a covenant, the parties un-
dertake obligations that will not necessarily end at a specific moment.
The responsibilities of covenant members continue over time.12 8
The idea of covenant has broad implications for relationships in
general 129 and for lawyer-client relationships in particular. I propose
now to examine the lawyer-client relationship in light of Allen's three
core elements of covenant. How does a covenantal model of lawyer-
client relations differ from the typical contractual model? What obli-
gations does the covenantal model place upon lawyers?'3 What pos-
sibilities does it offer?
B. Lawyers And Clients Entrust Themselves To Each Other
In a covenant, the parties entrust themselves to each other. It is
easy to recognize how clients entrust themselves to lawyers. When a
client comes to a lawyer, the client is usually facing a serious decision
or problem. Often the client is emotionally vulnerable. The client
may be unfamiliar with the language and processes of the law.131
The client has no choice but to place herself in the hands of her
lawyer. This entrustment is inevitably accompanied by risk. The law-
123. David H. Smith, On Paul Ransey: A Covenant-Centered Ethic for Medicine, in
Verhey & Lammers, supra note 12, at 8.
124. Bouma, supra note 12, at 84.
125. Allen, supra note 110, at 32-39; see also Bouma, supra note 12, at 84 (following
Allen).
126. Allen, supra note 110, at 32-37.
127. Id. at 37-38.
128. Id. at 38-39.
129. For general discussions of the concept of covenant, see the sources cited supra
note 110.
130. While my focus in this Article is on the implications of covenant for the work
and ethics of lawyers, the implications for clients need to be explored as well. See infra
note 171 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why law-
yers often dominate their clients).
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yer may be incompetent or negligent. She may put her own self-inter-
est before her client's interest. She may treat her client less as an
adult than as a child or an object.' 32 Human covenants, however, are
founded upon mutual actions of risk and commitment. The lawyer too
must make an act of entrustment. 133 This is perhaps the biggest stum-
bling block to the forging of a covenant between a lawyer and her
client. In too many cases, as we have seen, the lawyer dominates and
controls her client (or, conversely, is dominated by the client). 134 It is
unrealistic and inaccurate to talk about mutual risk, commitment, and
trust when one party sees herself-and is seen by the other-as domi-
nant and in control of the relationship.
There can be no covenant unless and until the lawyer is willing to
forge a relationship of true equality and mutual respect. It is not
enough to approach the relationship as a matter of contract in which
each party has certain agreed-upon obligations to perform. Instead,
the lawyer must take the risk of encountering her client as a human
being of unconditional value, made in the image and likeness of God,
with all the uncertainties and risks that this entails. In a covenant, the
lawyer may be challenged. She may be hurt. She may even be
changed.35
It is a bit like entering a friendship.'36 If I am your friend, I must be
willing to learn from you and be challenged by you. If I am unwilling
to view our relationship in those terms, then I should not pretend to
enter into a friendship that does not exist. If I adopt a fundamentally
religious perspective on relationships-to repeat my earlier point, if I
see human life as essentially sacred and socia1' 37 -I am better able to
make this act of entrustment, because I already recognize that "my
client was sent to me by God; God proposes to deal with me through
my client."'13  This understanding frees me to accept the risks and un-
certainties of a covenantal relationship with my client.
132. Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 21.
133. Bouma, supra note 12, at 84 (stating that human covenants "are rooted in
events or actions, in gifts given or in mutual entrustments whereby persons become
vulnerable to one other").
134. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why cli-
ents sometimes dominate their lawyers).
135. See Shaffer, On Being a Christian, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that true moral
discourse requires both parties to be open to change).
136. Some legal scholars have analogized the lawyer-client relationship to the rela-
tionship between friends. The most well-known argument along these lines is Fried,
supra note 15. For sharp criticisms of Fried's friendship analogy, see Edward A.
Dauer & Arthur Allen Left, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 Yale L.J. 573
(1976): Simon, supra note 67, at 106-13;
137. See supra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
138. Shaffer, On Being a Christian, supra note 1, at 37.
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C. Lawyers And Clients Constitute A Moral Community
In a covenant the parties form a moral community in which each
has responsibilities to the other. Each affirms the other as one loved
by God, unconditionally, and possessing unconditional value. Each is
answerable to the other.' 39 Theologian William May talks of the reci-
procity of covenant: Each side needs the other, each side is not only
benefactor but beneficiary.'40 Lawyers need their clients, not only to
earn a living, but to carve out a meaningful and productive life at
work.
As I suggested earlier, conventional wisdom can imagine only two
ways of relating to clients. Either the lawyer is in charge of the rela-
tionship, or the lawyer abdicates personal moral agency and becomes
the amoral agent of her client. 4 Ironically, these two approaches,
which seem the mirror opposite of each other, betray a fundamental
similarity. In both situations, the parties are isolated from each other
and closed to change.
This conventional wisdom has little to offer lawyers and clients in a
case where the lawyer has moral doubts about a course of action. The
lawyer can quit;142 or the lawyer can stay, suppress her moral doubts,
and continue to fight as hard as she can for her client. 143 This narrow
vision of the lawyer-client relationship encourages the illusion that the
parties are locked into rigid roles, with nothing to contribute to each
other. In a covenant, no one is an island. Lawyers and clients are in it
together. Together they are more than they are apart.
1. Covenant and Conversion
Consider a case in which a lawyer and a client have a disagreement
over a moral issue. Perhaps the client is seeking an end that is lawful
but-the lawyer believes-immoral, or the client is pressuring the
139. Allen explains:
When two or more persons enter into a covenant relationship, they thereby
create and enter into a new moral community .... Part of what this implies
is that they have moral responsibility to, and not only for, one another, that
they are answerable to one another. But to belong to the same moral com-
munity carries with it a more basic implication: the recognition by each that
the other has worth, that each matters for his or her own sake, and not
merely that each is useful.
Allen, supra note 110, at 37 (emphasis omitted).
140. May, supra note 86, at 115-16.
141. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
142. The Model Rules require a lawyer to withdraw from representation if -the
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other
law." Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 1.16(a)(1). The Model Rules permit with-
drawal if "a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers re-
pugnant or imprudent," or if there is "other good cause." Id. 1.16(b)(3) & (6).
Withdrawal is subject to court approval. Id. 1.16(c).
143. When moral doubts are not discussed, they do not disappear, but continue to
exert an effect upon the lawyer-client relationship. See infra note 170 and accompany-
ing text.
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lawyer to adopt a tactic that the lawyer has moral qualms about using.
Perhaps, after a full and frank exchange of views, the client will
change her mind.
A second possibility is that the parties will explore the issue fully
yet fail to reach an accord. Perhaps the lawyer will eventually assert
her right of "conscientious objection," as Thomas Shaffer calls it, and
refuse to act further for the client."' Even in such a case, insists Shaf-
fer, something important has been accomplished, because the parties
have listened to and influenced each other, perhaps in ways that could
not have been anticipated.1 45
But there is a third possibility as well. Perhaps the lawyer's moral
doubts will be dispelled as she listens to her client tell her story. Per-
haps the lawyer will come to understand more fully what motivates
her client, appreciate and accept her client's objectives, and choose to
continue as her client's companion and lawyer. The lawyer may even
have to abandon some of her deep-seated biases and beliefs as she
comes to know and respect this human being with whom she is in
covenant.
146
If we keep in mind that lawyers and clients form a moral commu-
nity, we can appreciate the inadequacy of the contract model. The
idea of contract cannot capture the richness and open-endedness of
the relationship, the possibilities for change and conversion. Rather
than speak of the "parties," as we do when we speak of contract, it
would be more accurate to talk of the "partners" to a covenant, for
the word partner signifies mutual dependence and a joint effort to
achieve a common good.'47
2. The Gratuitousness of Covenant
As we saw earlier, a contract model tends to be minimalistic. 14 A
lawyer owes her client only what their agreement demands, nothing
more.149 Covenant is not so limited. Our obligations are not so easily
discharged. A lawyer in a divorce action, for example, may find her-
self listening to her client tell a story of abuse and betrayal. What is
called for is not only competent legal service, although that is always
required,'150 but a compassionate heart as well.
As William May puts it, there is a gratuitousness to covenant that
contract lacks: The parties go beyond the bottom-line and do things
144. Shaffer, On Being a Christian, supra note 1, at 29; see also supra note 142.
145. Shaffer, On Being a Christian, supra note 1, at 29.
146. Theologian Karl Barth expressed this point well: "He who takes the risk of
counseling must be prepared to be counseled in turn by his brother if there is need of
it." Karl Barth, The Humanity of God 87 (1960).
147. Benjamin Sells, The Soul of the Law 62 (1994).
148. May, supra note 86, at 118; see also notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
149. But see supra note 81 (discussing the fiduciary obligations of lawyers).
150. See Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 1.1 (requiring lawyer competence).
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for each other because they recognize a duty to serve, not because
they are affirmatively required to do so."' It is the difference be-
tween a seller's relationship with a buyer and our intimate relation-
ships with friends and family members.
In a covenant, each partner has obligations that are measured not
by explicit commitments but by the needs of the other. While a con-
tract model assumes an equality in bargaining strength between the
parties, covenant is more realistic. Bouma makes the point well:
[C]onditions such as illness, immaturity, and differing expertise can
make covenanted people quite unequal. Perhaps they are equal in
dignity and worth, but they are not always equal in their ability to
express that dignity and worth. So the inequality of people is as
relevant to covenantal responsibilities as is their equality. The in-
creased vulnerability of one partner automatically implies greater
responsibility on the part of the other.152
Covenant places limits on the capacity of the more-powerful to take
advantage of the weaker. William May argues that this is an impor-
tant reason for preferring covenant to contract:
[T]he reduction of ethics to contractualism alone fails to judge the
more powerful of the two parties (the professional) by transcendent
standards .... As opposed to a marketplace contractualist ethic,
the biblical notion of covenant obliges the more powerful to accept
some responsibility for the more vulnerable and powerless of the
two partners. 53
The more-powerful party (often the lawyer) must understand that
what she does for and to the other is judged not by the mathematical
minimalism of contract but by the "transcendent standards" of God.
A lawyer in covenant sees her client as a human being, a human being
in pain and emotional turmoil, not as a mere commodity or fee-payer.
Covenant provides a check on selfishness and professional domination
that contract does not. It reminds us that we encounter our God as we
encounter each other.1' 4
D. Lawyers And Clients Have Enduring Responsibilities
A contract usually has a fixed or limited quality to it. Once a party
"discharges" the contract, she is released from her obligations to the
other party. Covenants are more enduring: Think of a parent's rela-
tionship with her child or a wife's relationship with her husband.
There is no fixed terminal point beyond which each person's responsi-
bilities magically disappear. 5
151. May, supra note 86, at 119-20.
152. Bouma, supra note 12, at 87.
153. May, supra note 86, at 123-24.
154. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
155. Alien, supra note 110, at 38-39.
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At first glance, the enduring nature of covenantal relationships may
seem to exclude many encounters between lawyers and clients. After
all, while some lawyers have ongoing relationships with clients, others
represent clients on a one-time basis. Once the client's immediate
problem has been resolved, the relationship ends.
By enduring, however, we do not mean eternal (although God's
covenant with humanity meets that condition). As Joseph Allen ex-
plains, "[t]he responsibility may endure for a shorter or longer time,
but it continues throughout the life of that covenant.' '1 56
So too with lawyers and clients. If a lawyer views her client as a
covenant partner, she accepts responsibility for the relationship, not
just today or tomorrow, but for as long as it persists. This requires an
unswerving allegiance to the other, a steadfastness, a constancy of de-
votion that continues over time. Although the precise demands upon
the lawyer may change, her duty of faithfulness to her partner and to
their relationship endures. 157
The enduring quality of the lawyer-client covenant reminds us that
today's actions have lasting consequences. 15 8 A word spoken in haste
cannot easily be retrieved. A small kindness today may bear rich fruit
tomorrow. For good or for ill, the actions of covenant partners influ-
ence each other in unforeseen ways. Although the lawyer-client con-
tract is finite and limited, covenant has no fixed boundaries.
E. The Lawyer as Moral Companion
There is an additional dimension of covenant that is implicit in our
discussion but deserves further attention. As a grizzled old corporate
lawyer once told me, "Covenant is a nice idea, professor, but don't
forget that sometimes clients pay me to give them a kick in the
pants.' '1 59
Consider again the analogy between covenant and friendship. 160
Lawyers and clients in covenant are not precisely the same as good
friends-we do not buy our friends with money-but they are like
friends in that each has made a commitment to be open to and to
156. Id. at 38.
157. Indeed, some obligations survive even the termination of the lawyer-client re-
lationship. After the relationship ends, for example, the lawyer's duty of loyalty re-
mains, and she cannot represent a new client against a former client in the same or a
similar matter. Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 1.9. The duty of confidentiality also
continues beyond the end of the relationship-even beyond the life of the former
client. Rule 1.6 cmt.
158. Allen, supra note 110, at 38-39.
159. This lawyer's comment brings to mind the words of the lawyer and statesman
Elihu Root, "About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling would-be
clients that they are damned fools and should stop." Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation
Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession Is Transforming American
Society 37 (1994) (quoting Root).
160. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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learn from the other. One of the things I want from a friend is a
kindly ear, a willingness to listen and to withhold hasty judgments.
But that is not all that I want. I also want honesty and moral com-
panionship from my friend. There are times when a friend, a true
friend, will say to me candidly, "Look, that doesn't sound like you.
Are you sure that's what you want to do?" A true friend reminds me
of the kind of person I aspire to be at my best rather than blindly
supporting whatever I choose to do at my worst. 161 In the same way,
lawyers can serve as a voice calling clients back to their better selves,
reminding clients of their deepest values, loves, and obligations. A
lawyer can serve as a moral guide or moral companion to her clients.
Consider a man who comes to a lawyer with a grievance against his
son.162 The client is angry because of his son's announcement that he
and his girlfriend are going to have a baby. Marriage is not in their
plans. The client, a devout Christian with traditional beliefs, now says
to the lawyer, "I want you to rewrite my will and leave my son out of
it!"
The lawyer could immediately redraft the will. But if the lawyer
knows her client well, and if she sees herself in covenant with her cli-
ent, then she understands that her responsibilities go beyond the pro-
vision of technical legal assistance. The lawyer recognizes that she
and her client are in a relationship in which they cannot help but influ-
ence each other. Like a good friend, the lawyer cannot help but won-
der if what her client demands, in the heat of the moment, is really in
her client's best interests. Like a good friend, the lawyer will seek to
engage her client in a conversation about the proposed change.
The codes of professional responsibility permit but do not require
this kind of moral conversation. Model Rule 2.1 provides that a law-
yer "may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to
the client's situation. ' 163 Despite this invitation to engage in moral
dialogue, lawyers often refrain from discussing moral concerns with a
client. Some lawyers consider themselves to be in control of the rep-
161. Aristotle wrote, "The perfect kind of friendship, however, is that of good men
who resemble one another in virtue. They both wish well to one another as good men,
and it is their essential character to be good men. Those who wish well to their
friend's sake are friends in the truest sense." Christopher Biffle, A Guided Tour of
Selections From Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 119-120 (1991); see also Simon, supra
note 67, at 108 ("The classical definition of friendship emphasizes, not the adoption by
one person of another's ends, but rather the sharing by two people of common
ends.").
162. This example is based loosely on Thomas Shaffer, On Being a Christian, supra
note 1, at 3-4.
163. Model Rules, supra note 34, Rule 2.1. The Comment goes on to say, "It is
proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations when giving
advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considera-
tions impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will
be applied." Id. Rule 2.1 cmt.
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resentation. They see no reason to involve their client in a discussion
of such matters. Others regard their client as in control of the repre-
sentation. They fear that to raise moral issues would be to impose
their own values upon their client."6
In a true covenant, however, each side must be respected, and each
must be free to voice her concerns and worries. It does not violate
client autonomy to ask, "Is that really what you want to do?"; or to
say, "Let's talk about this some more."
Instead of telling the client who wants to disinherit his son what he
can do, the lawyer can ask her client to reflect about what he should
do.165 Sometimes the lawyer need only speak a single word: Why?
Why do you say that? Why do you want to do that? This is the es-
sence of the lawyer's role as moral companion: to assume the best
about our clients, not the worst;166 to create a space for clients to think
before they act; and to help clients to act in accord with their funda-
mental values.
Ultimately, of course, the client has the legal right to disinherit his
son. If his lawyer decides not to represent him, the client can find
another lawyer to redraft the will. But the lawyer does her client and
herself a disservice when she does not at least encourage moral reflec-
tion and dialogue. 167
Often the lawyer is uniquely situated to be a catalyst for such moral
reflection. A lawyer who represents a corporation on a continuing
basis, for example, comes to know her client and its organizational
culture. Over time, the client comes to respect and trust the lawyer.
With such a history, the lawyer can become a voice for the corporate
conscience. When moral questions arise, the lawyer is enough of an
insider to be listened to and taken seriously, but enough of an outsider
to preserve a needed objectivity and independent moral vision. The
164. Whether a lawyer dominates her client, or the client controls the lawyer, the
result is a similar bracketing of moral questions. See supra notes 70-74 and accompa-
nying text.
165. Shaffer reports using a similar hypothetical. After he discusses with his stu-
dents how to disinherit the son, he asks his students, "Now that you know you could
do this for this client, I wonder whether you would do it." Thomas Shaffer, On Being
a Christian, supra note 1, at 4.
166. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev.
319 (1987).
167. Notice how this notion of the lawyer as moral companion is linked to our
earlier discussion of covenant. It is possible to discuss moral issues openly and frankly
with a client, without falling into the trap of lawyer domination or client domination,
but only if there already exists a relationship of mutual respect and trust. If a person
proposes to do something foolish, she will probably reject out-of-hand the criticism of
a stranger as irrelevant, uncalled for, and overbearing. But she might be willing to
listen to a friend who asks her to reconsider her decision, because she knows that her
friend wants only what is best for her. Moral companionship presupposes a covenan-
tal relationship.
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lawyer can be a voice that asks "why" when everyone else in the com-
pany feels compelled to mumble "yes.""
1. Saying No to Clients
This raises a related point: There are times when a lawyer must be
willing to say "no" to clients. This is necessary not only to preserve
the lawyer's own moral values, but also to preserve an essential ele-
ment in a true covenant: the freedom to say "no." Each side must be
given the space to be the kind of person she was meant to be. Each
must maintain moral accountability for her own actions within a con-
text of shared accountability to and for the other. Neither can become
the rubber stamp of the other.
This too is part of the lawyer's duty towards her clients. To be will-
ing to say, after discussing a matter fully, "I will not do this. I cannot
do what you ask." And to say further, whether explicitly or implicitly,
"I'm not sure you want to do it, either." '69
If, on the other hand, a lawyer refuses to voice her moral doubts,
those doubts do not disappear. Her moral misgivings go underground
and fester, contaminating and subverting her dealings with her cli-
ent.'" ° If a lawyer truly respects both her client and herself, she must
be willing to voice her worries, fears, frustrations, and resentments.
To do so will not necessarily threaten the relationship. In the long
run, it can strengthen it, just as Yahweh's covenant with Israel was
deepened and enriched by the willingness of both sides to express
honestly their disagreements and disappointments.
F. The Costs and Benefits Of Covenant
This preliminary sketch of the covenantal model has left many is-
sues unexplored. Consider the following: 1) How do we apply the
model to lawyers who have only one client-for example, lawyers for
large organizations like corporations? 2) How do we apply the cove-
nantal approach to lawyers who do not have clients at all in the con-
ventional sense-prosecutors, for example, and government lawyers?
3) What are the responsibilities of clients towards their lawyers? For
example, how should a lawyer relate to clients who have no interest in
forging a relationship of mutuality and equality?171 4) More broadly,
168. I discuss the issue of giving moral advice to an institution in more detail in
Allegretti, supra note 64, at 55-57; see also Shaffer, On Being a Christian, supra note
1, at 111-20.
169. In some cases, of course, the lawyer may conclude that her only ethical course
is to withdraw from the representation. See supra note 142.
170. See Joseph Allegretti, Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients: An Essay on
George Orwell and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 27 Creighton L Rev. 1 (1993).
171. A related question is whether differences in religious values between a lawyer
and her client might impede the formation of a covenant.
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what are the forces in modem legal practice that make it difficult to
nurture and maintain covenantal relationships with clients?
These and other questions must be addressed if we are to gain a
fuller understanding of the strengths and limitations of the covenantal
model. We should remember, of course, that no one model of the
lawyer-client relationship captures the whole of reality. Each has its
own advantages and disadvantages; each distorts as well as
illuminates. 72
Two points should be made in closing. First, by presenting a cove-
nantal model of lawyer-client relationships, I do not want to give the
impression that contract notions are irrelevant. The contract model
establishes the bottom line of the relationship. Sometimes that is the
only relationship the parties intend; consider, for example, the
purchase of an automobile. At other times, covenantal relationships
can go awry, and contract stands ready to protect the basic rights of
the parties. As Bouma puts it:
The most important and well-intentioned of covenants can break
down because of sin, ignorance, or incompetence .... [S]ometimes
the rupture cannot be healed, and people begin talking through
third parties-malpractice or divorce lawyers. At such a point, the
bare bones of the covenant must be examined-not for resuscita-
tion but for guidance about the minimal duties and privileges im-
plied in the earlier entrustment. Even when the covenant does not
rupture, fallen spouses, preoccupied parents, overly busy profes-
sionals, confused clients, and rebellious children sometimes need to
be reminded of the minimal claims that can be made, claims that
can be asserted as rights rather than requested as charity.' 73
The choice, then, is not between contract or covenant. Covenant
builds upon and enlarges contract. Lawyers can choose to approach
their work more as a matter of covenant than of contract, but in the
real and messy world of the law they will inevitably partake in a bit of
both. 74
Second, although there are risks to adopting a covenantal model, I
believe that the benefits are worth the risks. Critics of this approach
sometimes claim that it can take too much time and can lead to
burnout if lawyers become overly entangled in their clients' troubled
172. See supra note 75.
173. Bouma, supra note 12, at 90.
174. We might adopt the language of theologian Reinhold Neibuhr and think of
covenant as a kind of impossible possibility. Neibuhr used the term to describe the
teachings of Jesus at the Sermon on the Mount. Although the ethic of total love
expressed in the Sermon on the Mount is impossible for any human being to live out
completely, it remains relevant in daily life, for it always judges us, challenges us, and
calls us to do more. We can always approximate the Sermon on the Mount more fully
in our lives, even if we can never live up to it absolutely. In the same way, covenant is
an ideal that we can never live out completely, but can always strive to approximate
more closely. Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (1935) (espe-
cially chapters 2-4).
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lives. Critics charge that covenant can tempt lawyers to assume a
competence in matters over which they have little or no expertise.
On the other hand, covenant opens the door to a new way of relat-
ing to clients. It can give lawyers a sense of connection with their
clients. It can help them feel that they are making a difference in their
work. Covenant can help tired and disgruntled lawyers regain a sense
of meaning and service. Furthermore, clients seem to be happier
about their lawyers' work and more satisfied with the results when
they have been treated as equal partners in the relationship.'" Client
involvement also improves the quality of the representation-the law-
yer has a clearer sense of her client's motives and concerns, and a
better picture of what her client wants and needs.' 76
Covenant also allows a lawyer to maintain a sense of moral agency.
No longer does she have to live a compartmentalized life where her
deepest values are relegated to weekends and evenings. Instead, she
and her client are free to discuss moral questions openly because each
has the other's trust and is morally accountable to the other. No
longer must the lawyer opt either for moral dominance or for moral
abdication. 77
For these reasons, it makes sense to supplement or replace the pre-
vailing contractual model of lawyer-client relationships with the cove-
nantal model. While any lawyer can aspire to a covenantal
relationship with her clients, it is a particularly appropriate goal for
Christian lawyers who wish to integrate their religious values with
their work on behalf of clients. If a lawyer wants to bring her faith
and her work together, if she wants to love her God and love her
neighbor, if she wants to live a life of discipleship and service, she
need look no further than the human being who sits across the desk
from her.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that religion has an important role to play in
our thinking about legal practice and legal ethics. My argument has
been two-fold. First, I pointed out a number of serious problems that
result from adopting a rigidly secularistic approach to the study of
lawyers and legal practice. Second, I presented a case study of how
religion might be brought to bear upon a specific issue in legal prac-
tice-namely, the lawyer-client relationship. I do not claim that the
covenantal model I have proposed is the best or only means of envi-
sioning the encounter between lawyer and client. I do claim that reli-
gion can help us to see that encounter in new and rewarding ways.
175. See Rosenthal, supra note 65.
176. Id.; see also Simon, supra note 67, at 52-61 (arguing that lawyers often impute
to clients a few crude and selfish ends, such as the maximization of wealth).
177. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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